audits (now required in 38 states), which can alert                False Manipulation Narratives Could
      election officials to manipulation or errors.                Undermine Public Confidence

         We assess that cyber operations targeting the                      We assess that adversaries could also make false
electronic tabulation of results could delay results               claims about their ability to manipulate US election
reporting from affected jurisdictions, potentially                 infrastructure as part of a broader effort to undermine
creating public uncertainty but probably not affecting             confidence in US democratic processes. Much of the
the integrity of certified results. Tabulated results are          voting public probably knows little about the process of
stored independently of copies displayed on results                administering US elections, which could allow false
websites, although investigations of malicious activity            narratives to gain traction. Government efforts to
could delay results and introduce public uncertainty               investigate and publicly invalidate such claims could
about the validity of vote counts. Denial of service               take weeks or months, providing time for concerns about
(DOS) attacks or manipulation of copies of the results in          election security to spread. Disproving claims would
transit would delay public access to the results or make           also be impossible if adversaries evaded US intelligence
them difficult to access, creating the appearance of               collection.
modified results.
                                                                                 Adversaries could make wholly fabricated
              The Blue Ribbon Commission on the                         claims, such as announcing that they have
      vulnerabilities of Pennsylvania’s election                         compromised all US voting machines, a claim that
      infrastructure found the transmission of                           would be difficult and time-consuming—or
      preliminary results to public-facing websites is                   impossible—for the US Government to disprove.
      vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks, in
      which the attacker manipulates data mid-                                   Adversaries could also link an exaggerated
      transmission. Such attacks would not alter                         claim—for example, about their ability to affect the
      separately stored certified copies of tabulation                   election outcome—to actual operations, such as
      results, which are processed offline, but even short               DOS attacks against election-related websites or
      delays in reporting the results could introduce                    intrusions into voter registration databases.
      doubts about the security of the election or the                   Linking the two could introduce public doubts
      validity of the results.                                           about the validity of the election, even if the actual
                                                                         cyber operations were unrelated to the casting,
                                                                        tabulating, and reporting of votes.

                                                                                 A widely publicized compromise of
                                                                         election infrastructure probably would undercut
                                                                         public confidence in the election, even if the
                                                                         compromise was not used to manipulate election-
                                                                         related data or systems.

                                                                             Mitigating Threats to Infrastructure
              In May 2019, unidentified cyber actors
      rendered a US county election website unavailable                    We assess that enhancing the physical security
      on the night of a mayoral primary; the incident did          and cyber protections of election systems and messaging
      not affect the tabulation results, which were stored         the US public and adversaries could mitigate some of the
      on a separate system not connected to the Internet.          vulnerabilities of the complex US election process.
                                                                   Potential measures include the following:


                                                             [4]
            Physical Security and Cyber Hygiene.
    These terms refer to adopting best practices for the
    physical and cyber protection of election facilities
    and equipment. Basic security
    measures―replacing obsolete equipment,
    strengthening password policy and audit processes,
    and implementing network segmentation―might
    prevent less sophisticated adversaries from
    disrupting election processes but probably would be
    insufficient to deter the most advanced and
    determined nation-state actors.

            Third-Party Vendor Verification.
    Establishing and refining screening procedures for
    vendors who manufacture or transship election
    infrastructure could reveal shared vulnerabilities or
    insider threats.

             Public Messaging and Education. Public
    messaging would be vital to providing accurate and
    timely information about the effects and limited
    scope of low-impact cyber operations. Partnerships
    with state and local election officials, cyber security
    firms, and the media could help minimize
    commercial disruptions, as well as counter cyber-
    enabled information operations. Timely public
    messaging before the election would help to
    educate the public about adversary goals and make
    US officials the trusted source for information
    about the integrity of the election process, recovery
    efforts, and investigations into attempted cyber
    attacks.

           Messaging to Adversaries. Privately
    messaging adversaries to emphasize that attempts
    to manipulate US election infrastructure are
    unacceptable and would have serious consequences
    could deter them from taking such steps.


                                                              [5]