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DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM HT
AULT ERNATIVE ANALYSIS |

16 October 2020

YSIS

NICM 2020-09381

GE Making the Case That China Has Taken Some Steps to Influence

the Presidential Election

GE Scope Note: This memorandum was
prepared by the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for
Cyber and the Director, Election Threat Analysis
(D/ETA). It offers an alternative perspective to the IC’s
assessment that China has not attempted to influence the
outcome of the 2020 Presidential election. It was provided
to the IC for comment before publication but is not an IC-
coordinated memorandum.

The NIO for Cyber and the Director for
Election Threat Analysis (D/ETA) assess that Beijing
has taken at least some low-level, exploratory steps to
undermine the President’s reelection chances by
denigrating him and shaping voter perceptions. Their
assessment differs from the IC’s judgment that Beijing
has considered but not deployed influence efforts to
affect the Presidential election.

¢ (BBB The N10 and D/ETA assess that
Beijing’ s efforts probably have included overt
messaging, nascent online covert influence
capabilities, diplomatic measures, and the use
of economic leverage.

. i They assess that these efforts probably
have not included the use of Beijing’s most
aggressive options for influcncing or
interfering in the election,
SE cause
Beijing wants to minimize the risk of
blowback and hopes to stabilize the
relationship after the election.

© RBBB The Nio and D/ETA have low-to-

medium confidence in these assessments

ca
| much of the available reporting

would be consistent with either the mainline
or alternative view.

(U) IC Mainline Judgments

GE {he IC, including the NIO for East Asia and
other NIC officers, assesses Beijing has not deployed
influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the

US Presidential election. (is

that Chinese leaders desire stability in the US-China
relationship and believe they have a range of tools that
can achieve their goals regardless of who wins the

election. The IC also assesses
GE ht the election of either candidate

will present opportunities and challenges for China
probably informs their risk calculus against influencing
the election. The IC assesses that Beijing prefers to

respond to US actions with restraint to show resolve and
preserve the ability to repair relations after the election.

L) This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Cyber and the Director, Election Threat Analysis.

Quest

Classified By: J | Derived From

SES | Decision:

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NIC PM
. | 20°.

assessed that "hostile forces" could fabricate claims
that Beijing was interfering in the election to
demonize China and that no matter who won the
election Washington's hardline policies against
Beijing were unlikely to change,
EE Chinese
noted that Beijing should avoid giving Washington
any pretext to "scapegoat" China and to claim that it

was interfering in the election,
S|: es

also assessed, despite the President's attempts to
blame China to divert attention from the pandemic
and his electoral prospects, that managing tensions
without causing irreparable damage to bilateral
relations over the next six months remained in

Chin’ intrest rrr
© CE Chinese leaders

may have decided that there is little point to taking
the risk of an influence effort because they believe
their preferred outcome is probable. As early as
| year, Chinese assessed that
the pandemic and economic downturn had
diminished the President's reelection prospects and
since then Beijing has been planning for either
electoral outcome and conducting outreach to both

candidates and their campaigns,

GR The IC has seen no indication
FY that Beijing is engaged in an effort to

influence the outcome of the presidential election, nor
has it observed activity that it assesses is likely the
result of such an effort by Beijing. While we have seen
Beijing develop Po
HR ther options that could be used to

influence the election, we have not seen these
capabilities deployed.

GR aimed that China had not

interfered with the US election and
recommended that China speak and act
circumspectly when faced with US assertions
about Chinese and Russian interference,

° in | |
20
| to prevent the US President's

reelection by suppressing his base,

(U) An Alternative Perspective: Indicators of
Influence Efforts

Tic NIO and
D/ETA agree with the large majority of the IC’s
judgments about China’s calculus and approach to the
election. They assess, however, that the IC’s
judgment that no element of the Chinese Government
has taken any steps to influence the Presidential

election [ie
PO
rT at least through the summer. They also
have less confidence than the rest of the IC that
China’s preparations fo influence
efforts were not carried out [I
ES

contradictory reporting]

to

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NIC HM NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

SS The NIO and
D/ETA ass:
EEE

| | private sector and open source reporting on
influence activities already underway suggest that the

Chinese Government has been engaging in at least some
level of influence targeting US voters and candidates
with the knowledge that their activities could have an
effect on the election outcome.

© (U/AB IC Terminology:
Election influence includes overt

and covert influence activities of
foreign governments or actors

© SS Beijing began taking serving as agents of, or on behalf of,
unspecified steps around 2020 to foreign governments intended to

damage the US President's reelection campaign affect directly or indirectly a US

in response to US pressure on China’s | election—including candidates,

tecnology scr, politi panties, voters or thei

preferences, or political processes.
pe ee resi iad = ry ae pF
rd planning discussions among election influence targeted at the
ee aie aK
| officials to respond to US pressure including voter registration, casting

were taking place at increased frequency, and and counting of ballots;and
reporting of results.

that senior leaders expected China's

semiconductor industry would continue to be
e The NIO and D/E
damaged if the US President were reelected. = BEA

: . . assess that Chin: intend to
Unspecified Chinese Government officials ‘aes _—_
at least indirectly affect US

SS 2 Chinese Nic take

political processes, thus meeting the
definition of election influence

expected relief from sanctions if as a result of
their efforts, US resolve weakened ora
candidate from a named US political party were
elected instead of the President being reelected.

° Ha 2020,
ee

the
recommended that China collect derogatory

rr eS

Chinese Government had tasked its missions in
and| the US to use Chinese groups and organizations
official which the I recommended China to incite protests in the US to damage the

“sensationalize” at the appropriate time.

“black materials” on the US President,

President’s public standing and undermine his

reelection chances,

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NIC UH

NE 13 Chinese
i had assessed [|] that racial conflict

would be a large factor in the election,
i government-affiliated*! Chinese
technology company employees were assisting
ws 2 campaign,
ST «0 overtly

incite violence and protests against the US

Government.

| SY were experimenting i
i with the creation of deepfakes intended
to denigrate President Trump in response to
directives made by to improve
Beijing's ability to — public opinion.**

|] During the same period, a pro-China influence
network on US social media platforms posted messages
supporting Beijing's views that included some English-
language content denigrating the President and his
Administration’s policies. The activities of these
networks are consistent with what we would expect to
see from intelligence services or similar actors taking

steps to build nascent online influence capabilities;** the

NIO and D/ETA assess that their level of sophistication

© BRB Although we cannot directly tie this
network to the Chinese Government, the NIO
and D/ETA assess that elements of the
government were, at a minimum, aware of and

NATIONAL INTELLIGENC

COUNCIL

condoned the campaign, and may have directed
or conducted it. We base this assessment on the
alignment of the content with Beijing’s overt
messaging themes, its striking similarity to the
themes and tactics of previous [
Chinese influence campaigns that seek to blend
their influence operations into broader public
discourse, the duration and frequency of the
activity spanning several months, the rapidity
with which the network created videos in
response to world events, and the network's
consistent ability to operate outside China’s
Great Firewall.

social media platform took down a separate
cluster of unattributed pro-China accounts that
defended a range of Chinese interests, but which
also included accounts posing as Americans and
posting some US election-focused content. The
unidentified actors running these accounts
created four groups—one favoring the
President, two favoring his opponents, and one
that primarily denigrated the President.** The
accounts have since been shut down, but oth
could easily take their place and would be
difficult to detect;

ec IC assesses that

since 2018, China has been researching methods

and developing new tools for using online
covert influence operations to sway the
perspectives of American audiences. Chinese

ES 2c: I 2
report [EG on the potential
impact their covert influence operations could
have on the presidential election J
ee

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L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

These are
developments that the IC has identified as increasing the
likelihood that Beijing would seek to influence the
election outcome.*

HE China’s Possible View of an Influence
Campaign
PY The NIO and D/ETA assess
that China may intend much of its broader messaging
on issues in US-Chinese relations to also undermine
the President’s reelection prospects. China probably
views as low-risk broad campaigns that emphasize
specific issues in the US-China relationship and use a
mixture of public statements, diplomatic engagement,
private messaging, targeting of campaign donors, and
online covert efforts to influence US officials, firms,
and the public to oppose the President. Beijing has
authorized the conduct of increasingly aggressive overt
and covert influence campaigns aimed at criticizing
policies of the Administration while trying to avoid
blame for interfering in a U.S. Presidential election.

° Po China, starting in
March, launched overt and covert influence
efforts to shape the global public narrative
regarding Beijing's response to COVID-19 and
denigrate the Administration's pandemic
response, including by spreading disinformation
about the pandemic's origins and publicizing
English-language cartoons denigrating the
President’s handling of the crisis, judging from

5

open source
The NIO for Cyber and D/ETA s that
Chinese leaders believe these activities could

impact the election.*

+ EI 910), 2 nevspepe

owned by the Chinese Communist Party
claimed that economic measures Beijing could
take against supporters of legislation and
lawsuits seeking compensation from China over
the COVID-19 pandemic may affect US state
and congressional races.“ This was the first
time the IC had observed Beijing issue a public
warning that suggests it is willing to impose

economic costs that could affect US elections,

although ng 2019 advised
| to gain leverage over US policy by

directing unspecified resources to political swing

° SE 10 2p es01ve 2

border dispute with India in Beijing’s favor,

Chinese iY planned to

disseminate on US social media platforms

content” discrediting the Presi

*The NIO and D/ETA note that in NICM 2019-113 the
IC warned that, because China probably would use the
same tactics to influence the election as it already uses to
influence US policy, we might not detect such a pivot

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NIC I
I 823 ove: 2

least the past year has stepped up its efforts to
influence the views and policies of candidates
for US political office, |
es
targeting their key advisors and financial
donors,

Chinese diplomats acknowledge the sensitivity
of targeting donors and have sought to hide
such activity from US authorities.

Tepe te

assessments of the NIO and D/ETA is the fact there is
no reporting to suggest that China has engaged in
some of the more aggressive measures available to it to
influence the US election outcome, such as funneling
large donations or trying to compromise voting
infrastructure® or interfere with mail-in ballots. There
are also indications that some elements of state power,
such as trade, are being used ambiguously. For

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

example, despite trade disputes, China continues to
buy agricultural products as part of the Phase One
trade deal which Beijing probably assesses will help
the President’s reelection bid as well as help stabilize
the bilateral relationship. The apparent lack of a

whole-of-government campaign to favor one side

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NIC HH NAT INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

ME Comparing Judgments on Chinese Election Influence

GE The NIO for Cyber and the Director for ahead of the election. Their assessment differs from the
Election Threat Analysis assess that Beijing has IC’s consensus judgments primarily in confidence levels
taken at least some low-level, exploratory steps to and on whether Beijing has deployed influence efforts
try to undermine the President’s reelection chances to try to affect the outcome of the Presidential election.

by denigrating him and shaping voter perceptions

@ Yes ©} No

China has... MINORITY

ASSESSMENT

..Broad influence efforts in the United States
(diplomatic, business, media)

..Probable preference for Trump's defeat nal

..Considered an influence effort aimed
at the Presidential election | |

...Prepared options for influence effort
in Presidential election

..Concerns about risk versus gain in
any influence effort, particularly |

blowback if discovered |

..-Prepared for victory by either
Trump or Biden

oF
‘natt

... Avoided a whole-of-government
influence effort and any interference
with US clection systems

| —
—

to undercut Trump in election | =_=.tttC«SY

. Undertaken a few covert influence
efforts to undermine Trump’s reelection

...Intends public and diplomatic actions (x)

NIC * 2010-00891