DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL ASSESSMENT 1111111111 I 9 August 2020 NICA 2020-06885D - Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections (U) Key Takeaw ays manipulate voting processes at scale and without detection. - Scope Note: This is a downgraded version of a paper originally published on 19 August, 2020, and We are primarily concerned about ongoing includes information current as ofthat date. This paper and potential influence activity by Russia, China, updates NICM 2020-32, and Iran. and NICM 2020-033, • We assess that Russia is using a range of measures which also addresses primarily to denigrate former Vice President China's broader influence efforts. This paper does not Eiden and what it sees as an anti-Russia make assessments about the impact of these efforts on establishment. For example, it is directing the US. It also does not discuss efforts that the IC or encouraging proxies to spread claims cannot attribute to foreign actors, about Vice President Eiden. Some Kremlin- (U) Ahead of the 2020 US elections, foreign states linked actors are also seeking to boost will continue to use covert and overt influence President Trnmp's candidacy on social measures in their attempts to sway US voters' media. More broadly, Moscow's efforts preferences and perspectives, shift US policies, seek to amplify social discord in the US and increase discord in the United States, and undermine Washington's global standing. undermine the American people's confidence in our democratic processes. • We assess that China prefers that President Trnmp be defeated; in • - Foreign states or other actors may the past few months it has stepped up public seek to compromise our election rhetoric criticizing his Administration, infrastrncture for a range of possible which it recognizes may affect the election. purposes, such as interfering with the voting Although ■■■■■■ Beijing did not process, stealing sensitive data, or calling intend to try to affect the election, into question the validity of the election results. We judge that Russia, China, Iran, as well as many nonstate actors, have the capability to conduct such activities, although it would be difficult for them to online- influence, and collecting {U) This assessmem was prepared under rite auspices ofrhe National Inrelligence Officer (NIO)for Cyber. Ir was drafted by rhe National Jnre//igence CounciJIII Questions may be direaed ro the NIO Oassified By: I Derived From: I Declassify On: DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (U) Russia derogatory information about US public officials • - • - We also are monitoring for signs that other countries or nonstate actors such as criminal groups are acting on their preferences for the election and attempting to covertly influence public opinion, dismpt election operations, or jeopardize election data with tactics such as the use of ransomware. (U) Election Terminology (l ) Election influence includes overt and covert influence activities of foreign governments or • President Putin and senior Russian officials are overseeing efforts by actors serving as agents of, or on behalf of, foreign proxies governments intended to directly or indirectly affect a US election-including activities targeting to spread claims about fom1er Vice candidates, political parties, voters or their President Biden as well as Ulcrainian politicians preferences, or political processes. Election and alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 US interference is a subset of election influence election. These claims include that when the involving the technical aspects of the election, former Vice President was in office, he engaged in including activities targeting voter registration, criminal activity in his dealings with Ukraine and casting and counting ofballots, and the reporting of individuals tied to Ukrainian energy fum Burisma. results. Derkach, Kilimnik, and other proxy actors [2l DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL affiliated with the Russian Government are "United World International," advancing such nauatives with US officials and other prominent persons as well as online, These groups including through personal interactions and audio leverage their US contacts to seed their and documentary film releases via US and narratives more broadly into Western media, Ukrainian media outlets. • ••••••••• These figures are conspiring to intensify their efforts as the We continue to assess that Russia's election approaches to orchestrate a high-profile understanding of US electoral dynamics and its com1ption scandal implicating former Vice assessment of who is likely to win will guide its calculus President Eiden and the Democratic Party at the as the election approaches. Ongoing cyber operations peak of the 2020 US presidential campaign. could inform or fuel further influence efforts. For Their aim is to defeat the former Vice President example, as of June 2020, and ensure the President's victory. Some of reconnoitered multiple state and local government these proxy actors anticipate that Ukraine­ website themed narratives about Democratic corruption ; we do not know the purpose of this effo11. In will play a decisive role in the election and that July, a commercial cybersecurity company believed- US persons are key to propagating these may have targeted a US political organization, narratives. probably unsuccessfully, though we cannot independently attribute the activity. Russia for years has Since our assessment in May, targeted and collected information about current and Russia continues to use state former US Government officials, which it could leak to media, social media, and other online media platforms the public at any time. to denigrate the f01mer Vice President, the Democratic Party, and the US political "establishment/' and to (U) China promote divisions in the country. This content has largely been favorable to the President, but on occasion We assess that China prefers that the it criticizes his administration for policies that run President--whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on counter to Russian interests. China-does not win reelection. Although Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, • - Russian actors have circulated narratives about voter fraud resulting from mail­ in balloting and called some US primary voting online­ processes "rigged" by the Democratic Party. injluence, and collecting derogatory information about US public officials • ••••••••• Some Russian actors have shifted their focus from social media to on- line news sites. Since last year, the Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation (GRU) have employed cadres of US and other foreign authors to create anti-American and US-focused political content on English-language news platforms, including [3l DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL China uses mostly enticements and occasionally coercion to extract more pro-China ·­ Chinese a newspaper owned by the claimed that economic positions and to punish those whom Beijing views as measures Beijing could take against supporters of opposed to China's interests. It also employs legislation and lawsuits seeking compensation from disinformation and critical statements attacking the US China over the COVID-19 pandemic may impact Government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and US state and congressional races. This is the first other issues, such as the closure of the Houston time we have observed Beijing issue a public Consulate, Hong Kong, the legal status of the South warning that suggests it is willing to impose China Sea, and China's efforts to dominate the 5G economic costs that could affect US elections. market. a pro-China network of online accounts posted video content critical we judge of President Trnmp before it was deactivated by social that China will evaluate the implications of media platforms; various electoral outcomes on its interests. If Beijing We assess Beijing probably were to assess that the increasingly downward trajectory calculates that a concerted effort to influence the in US-China relations threatened China's rise and could Presidential election would backfiring not be dealt with using existing tools, it might attempt to and offer uncertain benefit, but- also recognizes more directly thwart the President's reelection, including - critical statements might affect the race. by leaking information or through online- influence network. • • • • • • [ 4] DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL the 2020 US elections by canying out oppornmistic intrusions against US private­ sector entities in effmts to collect :infotmation on US political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data. • - Beijing has (U) Iran expanded :its cyber collection of data related to Iran is conducting an influence campaign to undermine tile cuffent President and US Threats to Election Infrastructure democratic institutions, and to divide tile country in advance oftile 2020 elections. Teluan sees the current - We assess that hostile actors could exploit administration as promoting regime change in Iran, hltemet-connected election infrastructure-such as voter registration databases, pollbooks, and state or a view that increases the Iranian leadership's local election officials' websites-because of its ease interest in trying to prevent the President's reelection. of access and comparative lack of security. These Iran's efforts probably will focus on online covert systems are designed for accessibility, commonly influence, such as spreading disinformation on social through web portals, making them vulnerable to a media and recirculating anti-US content. range of malicious cyber activities. A committed adversary could potentially use access to these systems to disrupt or sow doubts about our democratic election processes. - We assess that hostile actors could also manipulate systems that count or tabulate votes­ such as voting machines-on a localized basis, but it • •••••••• Supreme Leader probably would be difficult to coordinate a Khamenei probably has authorized the campaign to alter voting results on a wide scale. influence campaign. These efforts focus largely Post-election audits and paper trails also most likely on creating or amplifying social media content would uncover such efforts in the nearly all US that criticizes the President and recirculating states. Similarly, foreign actors would have existing news reports, memes, and hashtags difficulty coordinating a laTge scale campaign to focused on US civil umest, domestic protests for manipulate mail-in voting, and robust postal racial justice, mail-in voting, and the tracking probably would detect any large-scale administration's handling of the COVID-19 effort. pandemic. - Cyber operations targeting the reporting of • electronic tabulation results could delay reporting but probably would not affect the integrity of certified results. Denial of service attacks would also delay public access to results. [sl DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL presidential candidates and that even impersonated a candidate in 2018. Tehran also uses these accounts to attempt to :influence US audiences by promoting messages aligned with Iranian policies. • Tehran's links to some of these efforts. Iran could attempt to manipulate or attack election :infrastructure-as it has in elections in the Middle East and South Asia-but we do not have • •----------- Over the past any information indicating that :it :intends to do so in the two years, social media companies have United States. It could also seek to collect and publicly removed thousands of Iranian-origin :inauthentic release damaging information. accounts-some with links to the Iranian Government-that have shared information • •---- hl January, Iranian-contract cyber critical of both the current President and other actors tried to compromise a server associated with - a US business :involved :in election infrastructure, FBI worked with the company to remediate the problem. • - hl June, Google announced that Iranian­ - linked cyber actors had unsuccessfully attempted to spearph:ish email accounts associated with campaign staffers working for the US President. Iran pursues such efforts in part to acquire • derogatory information it could release publicly, as well as to inform its broader aims of weakening the US and damaging its standing abroad. - (U) Other Foreign Actors - A range of other foreign actors have expressed preferences for the outcome of the election. We have • reporting on a few that have either considered or taken steps to attempt to covertly :influence US voters, presidential candidates, or US politics surrounding the - election. For example: • Senior Turkish officials, :including President Erdogan, believe that segments of the US Government have an entrenched, anti-Turkey viewpoint, and as a result have sought to covertly influence US politicians' and political candidates' thinking on [6 l DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL Turkey. Ankara's efforts have, over the past between the two leaders and her perception that year, included covert funding of US municipal the current administration's policies have election campaigns, unregistered lobbying complicated Germany's, the EU's, and NATO's efforts, and messaging on social media by state­ geopolitical positions, owned outlets. In public remarks in July, she :implicitly criticized the President's response to • - Criminal or other nonstate groups also the COVID-19 pandemic, and in June she cited have the capability to compromise US election the 2020 election as a "risk factor" for the EU infrastructure. Gaining access to election­ during a private video call with other European related systems could allow them to disrupt the leaders. voting process, steal sensitive data, or undermine confidence in the election results, but • ··········- Inmid-2019, we do not know whether any of them have Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman specific plans to do so. Some :incidents have expressed concern that Riyadh would lose US ab-eady occurred; in April, unidentified actors support for its priorities if the President were to used ransomware to compromise the computers lose the election in 2020, of a Virginia county administrator and vote registrar, the President was the most Saudi-friendly of any US - Other foreign actors have preferences for the President, outcome of the US presidential election, and in the mnup to November 2020 they may express their views in statements to the press, in diplomatic channels, or privately. Most probably will make only oblique or tempered public comments to avoid the appearance of trying to shape the outcome of the election. For example: • - German Chancellor Merkel almost certainly would prefer that President Tnunp not win reelection because of personality conflicts [7l DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 N IC 1111111111 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL IIIIIIIIEfforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape �is graphic describes efforts by selected activity. For example, the scope and scale of China's countries to attempt to manipulate aspects of the current influence activity at the state and local far US political landscape over at least the past four outpaces Russia's and Turkey's, and Russia has leaked years. It is not intended as a comparison of the scope, intelligence-acquired information more often than Iran. scale, or level of effort of each country's influence 0 Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic 0 Preliminary or preparatory steps, with or without specific intent ll"t. Observed V EFFORTS CD IRAN Releasing press statements, state-run media content 0 0 0 Covertly messaging on social media 0 0 0 Covertly influencing Executive Branch or Congressional leaders' thinking or policies 0 0 0 Covertly influencing state or local government leaders' thinking or policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 Publicizing information gathered through intelligence operations to damage a US politicalfigure or organization Targeting, accessing, or manipulating election processes or election-related systems 0 0 0 0 0 0 Influencing US law enforcement investigations, prosecutions, or other aspects ofthe US legal process Offering economic inducements to secure policy concessions 0 0 0 Retaliating for US decisions or actions [sl DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026