--- Page 1 ---
DECLASSIFIED BY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT WARRINGTON on 10 July 2026

To:
cea

nments

Subject: FW: ICA Co

From: FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (F3!) ay

Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 1:42 PM

‘a

Cc: UGORETZ TONYA FBI USA GOV

Subject: ICA Comments pF

Couple of thoughts on the updated ICA draft, all of which center on the minority view and some of
which you have previously heard from the FBI team. Generally speaking, while we are fine with the
inclusion of the minority view textbox, we firmly believe the analysis in said text box must comport
to the same analytic standards as the rest of the ICA. This is an absolute red line for the FBI.
Additionally, we do not support the inclusion of the minority view in the KJs; without proper context
and source descriptions, the minority view is given parody to the ICA assessments. Below are some
more specific points:

--- Page 2 ---
In the first para, the NIO notes that China’s leaders also “intended” some of Beijing’s efforts to
indirectly affect US candidates, etc. The IC has repeatedly stated, based on a body of intelligence,
there is no evidence of said intention, though we note there was an awareness of this potential
effect. To state this as bluntly as the NIO does, without evidence to support this claim, is extremely
misleading.

In the second para, the NIO notes he gives move weight to several clandestine and liaison reports,
without any sort of source description whatsoever. By minimizing the source descriptions,
clandestine reporting from US or liaison sources of dubious credibility, poorly identified sourcing
chains, and minimal track records of reporting is given the same weight as signals intelligence of
identified senior Chinese diplomatic and intelligence figures, as well as clandestine reporting of
decision making in Beijing from sources with established records of reporting that is generally
reliable.

In the last tic, the NIO assesses China “may” also have encouraged protests. There is no evidence of
this in the reporting, and the citations associated with this tic certainly do not support this
assessment. This is highly misleading and a misrepresentation of the underlying reports.

The final para in the dissent argues that we have collection gaps on the entities that would probably
execute influence operations. This point appears to acknowledge that IC collection demonstrated
that China’s leaders practiced restraint and did not intend to influence the outcome of the election
and instead focuses on where collection gaps might miss evidence of the execution of influence ops.
This shift in focus by the NIO is inconsistent with earlier portions of the dissent argumentation and
argues that US collection did not find what China has actually done. As we’ve said before, citing the
absence of evidence is an absolute red line for us.

Thanks again for all the work on cnis . . we will continue to stand by for any additional drafts,
etc. On a more positive note, the Iran section edits are much improved and we greatly appreciate
you working with us on this! | am out of the office tomorrow, but Cynthia is in should you need to
reach anyone on the team. We will be back in full force Monday.

Have a wonderful New Year,
Nikki

DAD Nikki L. Floris

Counterintelligence Division
Open:
NSTS:

FBIHQ Rr

Classification: i.