--- Page 1 --- APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT WARRINGTON on 10 July 2026 Declassified by D/CIA Ratcliffe on 1 July 2026 ET pee ers ai ne ea es X AN “L CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY F 4 CIA NOTE (U) Summary of Select Intelligence Reporting from 2004- 2020 on Venezuela’s Electronic Voting Manipulation Capabilities 29 June 2026 py (x) imc --- Page 2 --- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY C fA N OT E “29.June 2026 (U) Summary of Select Intelligence Reporting from 2004-2020 on Venezuela’s Electronic Voting Manipulation Capabilities (U) Summary eee 'ntelligence Community reporting from 2004-2020 documented persistent concerns about Venezuelan government manipulation of electronic voting systems and the potential national security implications for US election infrastructure. The intelligence established that Venezuelan government officials developed sustained jnterest-and likely some capability in manipulating electronic voting systems, including Smartmatic technology, to influence electoral outcomes in Venezuela. The 2006 Intelligence Community assessment that Smartmatic's ties to Venezuela posed.a national security threat was based on solid intelligence regarding Venezuelan government intent to influence US politics and evidence of Venezuelan manipulatian of their own electoral systems. This assessment led to US government action forcing Smartmatic to divest'its. US operations in 2007. BRgaeamaes reporting indicated that electronic voting systems contained vulnerabilities that could theoretically be-exploited by sophisticated actors with insider access. However, while the intelligence validated significant concerns about foreign-linked voting technology vendors, it did not-definitively confirm that large-scale electronic fraud was successfully executed in specific Venezuelan elections, with CIA's baseline assessments maintaining that other factors: better explained electoral outcomes. The reporting on advanced techniques like aaa provided concerning insight into alleged Venezuelan government capabilities and intent, but came from. limited sourcing. (U) Venezuela Government Interest in (U) Scope Note: This summary focuses on Election Manipulation what (ntelligence Community reporting oe established regarding Venezuela's intent ee EE (ntelligence sources and capabilities to manipulate voting between 2004 and 2020 reported that Venezuelan machines, both domestically and President Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas potentially:in othér countries. Itis nota Maduro demonstrated sustained interest.in comprehensive re-assessment of all manipulating electoral outcomes through available intelligence on this topic, but electronic voting systems. In April 2004, . rather a summary of key findings from intelligence reporting indicated Chavez stated his select intelligence documents spanning objective was to prevent the reelection of a sitting 2004 to 2020. / US president, suggesting intent to influence US domestic politics This.finding was part of the basis for the Intelligence Community's 2006 under.the auspices of Depiity Director of CIA for Analysis. Thils product reflects a CiA perspective and was not codrdinated within the intelligence Community, it was produced --- Page 3 --- CIA NOTE assessment that Smartmatic's acquisition of US voting systems company. Sequoia posed.a “moderate threat” to US national security.” Eee Prior to Venezuela's 2012 presidential election, aaa reported that Chavez's intelligence services, including the General Directorate of Military Gounterintelligence {DGCIM} and the Bolivarian Intelligence Service {SEBIN), worked with the National Electoral Council {CNE):and Smartmatic to develop plans to manipulate election results using preprogrammed voting machines. reported that these plans called for deploying altered machinés to approximately 300 voting centers ‘in traditionally pro-Chavez areas to ensure victory by approximately 1.5 million votes.? Following the election, which Chavez won by ‘approximately 1.6 million votes, sources reported that Chavez congratulated his team for successfully implementing the manipulation plan.* NEN (n September 2020, EE ec ported that Venezuela had developed detailed technical plans to manipulate the December 2020 National Assembly elections using what were Hes According to this reporting, the technique involved creating a'second set of virtual machines that would replicate legitimate voting machine results, then substitute manipulated data while making. votes appear to originate from legitimate machines. aaa eae (U} Technical Capabilities and Vulnerabilities Eee CA analysts assessed in. 2006 that certain capabilities igaaaanae an régarding electronic voting manipulation were technically possible and operationally feasible.*” Specifically, aauaaaaamemem that voting machines in Venezuela had unspecified artificial intelligence components installed, were designed to alter vote tallies; could detect when. they were being audited, and could provide printed receipts without registering, recording or transmitting those votes,* While.CIA analysts judged these capabilities were theoretically achievable, this assessment focused on technical feasibility rather than confirmation that such features were actually implemented. Hii A 2033 CIA alternative analysis, produced using the "Devil's Advocacy" methodology, outlined a plausible scenario for how large-scale électronic manipulation could have occurred in Venezuela's 2012 election. without.detection. This analysis noted that Venezuela's electronic voting system was vulnerable to insider access, the centralized nature of the CNE’s control over voting technology, and gaps in-opposition monitoring capabilities. The report‘assessed that ‘if such manipulation occurred, "elections in Venezuela and other countries that are clients of the technology provider could be in doubt.'* However, CIA's baseline assessment maintained that.no large-scale electronic fraud occurred in 2012, based on pre-election.polling data, abserice of irregular voting patterns, and the opposition's concession.° Hees Intelligence reportirig consistently indicated that individuals with ties to Venezuelan intelligence services.had access to election technology.and voting systems. In 2012, sources reported that Chavez assigned an army communications specialist-to the:CNE to. provide real-time access.to election results." Reporting from 2012 also indicated that the CNE Information Technology Director, described as a confidant of the head of military intelligence with expertise in Voting technology, was. responsible for designing protocols for auditing voting software."2 These relationships: provided potential pathways for manipulation of electronic voting systems. --- Page 4 --- CIA NOTE () A Technique Ea | The September 2020 intelligence reporting on Qgaaaay plans provided the. most detailed description of a specific technical approach to-election manipulation, technique was allegedly-designed to:** ° eee Replicate digital hash fies sent to the central vote counting database; * SE Viinic real voting machines that favored the ruling party; > Eee Overwrite hash files of voting machines that favored the opposition; and ° Eee Make altered-votes appear to originate from legitimate voting machinés.”* this-technique-would, in:theory; allow the Venezuelan government to monitor and adjust results in real-time during and after the‘elaction. The reporting indicated that virtual machine technolagy would be employed:to accomplish this manipulation while evading detection through standard audit procedures,> {U) IC Assessments and Concerns Ei@gme The 2006 National Security Threat Assessment.produced by the National Intelligence Council evaluated Smartmatic's acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems as.a "moderate overall threat to US national security interests." This assessment was-based on séveral'factors: © Ea |ntelligence indicating Chavez's intent to influence US domestic politics and public opinion; © —Biy Reporting that the Venezuelan government manipulated Venezuelan national elections with Smartmatic's direct involvement; ° am intelligence that Smartmatic directors held'credentials.from Venezuelan intelligence services © By Open source reporting of corrupt relationships between Smartmatic and Venezuelan government officials; and © Wage Smartmatic’s and Sequoia’s reported contracts in approximately 400 US counties at the time.*® gg The assessment concluded that Smartmatic's susceptibility t6 Venezuelan government manipulation makes the acquisition a potential instrument for Venezuelan officials seeking to.undermine confidence in, or manipulate the-electoral process in, the United States.’ This finding led to préssure from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States {CFIUS) that résulted in Smartmatic divesting its ownership of Sequoia in'2007, Eee !n March 2018, Smartmatic ceased cperations in Venezuela-after publicly accusing the Maduro regime of inflating voter turnout by over one million votes inthe August: 2017 National Constituent Assembly election— figures that diverged from: data:recorded by. Smartmiatic’s voting machines. This represented-a. break between.Smartmatic. and the Venezuelan government after years of the:company providing electoral technology to:Venezuela.® --- Page 5 --- CIA NOTE {U) Limitations and Analytic Caveats Hig The intelligence reporting.contains important limitations that must be considered whén assessing what it establishes. Hg First, the 2006 Intelligence Community assessment concluded that neither Smartmatic nor the Venezuelan Government had the capability—thatis, the level of-control or.access required—to manipulate the outcome of an election outside of Venezuela in’a predictable fashion. Thée:Venezuelan.Government's-ability to manipulate the results of voting in Venezuela rested in part.on its. ability to.control every stage of the eléctronic voting process, from: initial acquisition of the machines to pre- and post- voting machine security, to programming, to storage of paper voting receipts;:to control of the audit'process. Neither the Venezuelan Government-nor Smastmatic would have'such a complete-spectrum of access:during an electoral process outside Venezuela. EE Second, ClA's-baséline assessment regarding Venezuela’s.2012 election maintained that large-scale electronic fraud did hot occur, despite RRB reporting of manipulation plans. This:assessment was supported by pre-election polling showing Chavez ahead by approximately 10 percentage points, a 24% increase in government spending before the election, the opposition's concession of defeat, and-CIA quantitative analysis showing: no irregular voting patterns indicative of systematic manipilation.> Third, the 2013 Devil's Advocacy Report that outlined’a plausible fraud scénario was explicitly.an alternative analysis: exercise rather than a definitive finding. The report acknowledged "conflicting reporting” and "limited insight into key elements of the electronic. voting system."24 Eee Fourth, the September 2020 reporting 0° a Ee EERE ee HERR 27 judged the regime did not need to resort to. gross fraud to win the December 2020 National Assembly elections, given that virtually the entire opposition boycotted and the regime had already co-opted opposition party leadership. --- Page 6 --- CIA NOTE